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Today record levels of funding are being invested in enforcement and an-
tipoaching measures to tackle the “war on poaching,” but many species are
on the path to extinction. In our view, intensifying enforcement effort is cru-
cial, but will ultimately prove an inadequate long-term strategy with which
to conserve high-value species. This is because: regulatory approaches are be-
ing overwhelmed by the drivers of poaching and trade, financial incentives for
poaching are increasing due to rising prices and growing relative poverty be-
tween areas of supply and centers of demand, and aggressive enforcement of
trade controls, in particular bans, can increase profits and lead to the involve-
ment of organized criminals with the capacity to operate even under increased
enforcement effort. With prices for high-value wildlife rising, we argue that
interventions need to go beyond regulation and that new and bold strategies
are needed urgently. In the immediate future, we should incentivize and build
capacity within local communities to conserve wildlife. In the medium term,
we should drive prices down by reexamining sustainable off-take mechanisms
such as regulated trade, ranching and wildlife farming, using economic levers
such as taxation to fund conservation efforts, and in the long-term reduce de-
mand through social marketing programs.
Introduction
Poaching and illicit trade in high-value species in demand
in East Asian markets, including the tiger (Panthera tigris),
pangolins (Manis spp.), elephants and rhinoceroses, is
currently increasing or at conspicuous levels, for use
as medicine, luxury foods and curios (Challender 2011;
NTCA 2012; Biggs et al. 2013; Underwood et al. 2013).
As demonstrated at CoP16 of the Convention on Inter-
national Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora (CITES) in March 2013, strong support exists within
the international community, backed by animal wel-
fare and conservation NGOs, to counter this problem by
strengthening enforcement of trade regulations and es-
tablishing trade bans (Thorson & Wold 2010; O’Criodain
2011; Duffy 2013; EIA 2013). This is exemplified in policy
briefings and powerful marketing communications, for
example, “Ban the trade, burn the ivory, stop elephant poach-
ing” (Born Free 2013), to mobilize public support for this
policy (also see Stiles 2004; Born Free 2007; Duffy 2013;
EIA 2013).
However, trade restrictions agreed through CITES are
failing in many instances. Despite near universal acces-
sion to the Convention (currently 179 member countries
or “Parties”), high volumes of illegal trade in CITES-listed
species take place annually, which is currently worth an
estimated US$20 billion globally, and is having a seri-
ous and seemingly unsustainable impact on species of
high conservation value (see Rosen & Smith 2010; Phelps
et al. 2011; South & Wyatt 2011; Duckworth et al. 2012;
Stoner & Pervushina 2013). Indeed, despite nearly 40
years of regulation, CITES boasts few measurable conser-
vation successes and these are generally characterized by
local community engagement in combination with regu-
lated trade, as opposed to strict prohibitions under trade
bans (see Jenkins 2000; Martin 2000; Jenkins et al. 2004;
Amin et al. 2006; McAllister et al. 2009).
In this article, we argue that focusing principally on en-
forcement and antipoaching measures, or the metaphor-
ical “war on poaching” as it is frequently termed (see
Neumann 2004), risks making the same mistakes as the
“war on drugs” approach, which failed despite increasing
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enforcement effort (see Poret & Te´je´do 2006; Werb et al.
2013), as it is typically grounded in ethical concerns and
western perceptions of the killing of animals, rather than
an adequate understanding of the real drivers of poach-
ing and illegal trade. Using mainly economic arguments,
supported by data where appropriate, we assert that
pervasive and powerful market forces in China and the
Far East, coupled with crippling poverty in source areas,
may overwhelm future enforcement efforts especially
in countries where implementation is undermined
by corruption and weak governance. Consequently,
international funds should be increasingly directed
toward a broader range of interventions in a multifaceted
approach that directly address the drivers of illicit trade.
These interventions include a commitment to end rural
poverty in wildlife source countries by introducing
generous development benefits for local communities to
incentivize them to protect and/or sustainably manage
wildlife populations, a resumption of carefully regulated
trade in high-value species where appropriate, using
tax revenues to support sustainable management and
encouragement for research and development of wildlife
farming and ranching, and major investments in demand
reduction social marketing programs in nations such
as China.
Why poaching is more than an
enforcement problem
The principal approach to addressing poaching of wildlife
for international trade has to date been regulatory, re-
lying on individual Parties enforcing CITES (Hutton &
Dickson 2000; Broad et al. 2003). Entering into force in
1975, CITES was conceived in recognition of the threat
international trade poses to the survival of species and
functions by regulating or prohibiting international trade
in c.35,000 species, to ensure that it is not detrimental to
their survival in the wild (Wijnstekers 2011; CITES 2013).
It does so by listing species in one of three appendices and
restricting trade using a combination of trade controls and
bans, implemented through national legislation and en-
forcement mechanisms of its Parties (Reeve 2002; CITES
2013).
Despite existing investment in enforcement and an-
tipoaching measures however, illicit international trade
in many CITES-listed species is currently increasing or
is at record or conspicuous levels (e.g., Rosen & Smith
2010; Challender 2011; Milliken & Shaw 2012; NTCA
2012; Underwood et al. 2013) and there is growing recog-
nition that existing interventions maybe insufficient to
curb poaching (e.g., Drury 2011; Verı´ssimo et al. 2012;
Biggs et al. 2013). Table 1 lists some of the more valuable
species that are being affected by illegal trade, despite be-
ing CITES-listed, and in some cases despite huge sums
being invested in enforcement. For example, despite his-
torical investment in antipoaching and the commitment
of US$113.8 million by tiger range states to directly tackle
poaching over the first 5 years of the Global Tiger Recov-
ery Programme (GTRP), which aims to double the num-
ber of wild tigers globally by 2022, tiger populations are
continuing to decline (GTRP 2012). This is exemplified
in India, a tiger stronghold, where the number of tigers
poached for trade hit a record high in 2012 (NTCA 2012;
Stoner & Pervushina 2013). Equally, Chinese and Sunda
pangolin populations are estimated to have fallen rapidly
in recent decades, in the case of the Chinese pangolin
(Manis pentadactyla) by greater than 94% in China and
its border regions since the 1960s (Wu et al. 2004; Duck-
worth et al. 2008). Similarly, the Asiatic Black Bear (Ursus
thibetanus) is threatened by international trade in its parts
(e.g., gallbladder and paws), contributing to recent esti-
mated population declines globally of 49% (Garshelis &
Steinmitz 2008). Although global populations of African
elephant (Loxodonta africana) and White rhino (Cera-
totherium simum) are not declining, they are currently
subject to record levels of poaching, for ivory and rhino
horn, respectively (Biggs et al. 2013; Underwood et al.
2013) and some national populations are decreasing as
a result, for example, Tanzania (TAWIRI 2010). Equally,
it is forecast that at current rates of increase in rhino
poaching, populations of the White rhino in South Africa,
which holds roughly 93% of the global population, could
be extinct by 2025 (Ferreira et al. 2012; Martin 2012).
Although these species are highly valued alive and
in situ by conservationists, largely for their existence
value, they are equally in demand by those seeking to
profit from them through lethal harvesting, be this for
financial profit or sociocultural or livelihood reasons
(e.g., t‘Sas-Rolfes 2000; Roe et al. 2002; Donovan 2004;
Biggs et al. 2013). In our view, the decision to reduce the
complex social, cultural, and economic nature of wildlife
trade into a simple law enforcement problem therefore
fails to address the underlying drivers of poaching
and trade (Velasquez Gomar & Stringer 2011). It also
lacks legitimacy in source countries where it typically
translates into disincentives for rural people to conserve
wildlife and conflicts with local livelihood strategies,
traditional practices, and cultural norms (e.g., Roe et al.
2002; Donovan 2004; TRAFFIC 2008; Abensperg-Traun
et al. 2011; MacMillan & Nguyen 2013). Although CITES
has adopted provisions to consider potential impacts
of listing-decisions on livelihoods of the poor (e.g., Res
Conf. 8.3; Rev. CoP15), it does so only in implementa-
tion terms and not in decision-making, which remains
focused on establishing trade controls (Mathur 2009;
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Table 1 Ten high-value CITES-listed species subject to on-going illicit international trade
Species
Common Scientific IUCN Red CITES Population trend (taken Poaching Estimated retail Price
name name List status Appendix from IUCN Red List) pressure value (USD) trend
Tiger∗ Panthera tigris EN I Decreasing Increasing 50,000/animal –
Chinese pangolin† Manis pentadactyla EN II Decreasing Increasing 1,550/animal Increasing
Sunda pangolin† Manis javanica EN II Decreasing Increasing 1,550/animal Increasing
Musk deer‡ Moschus spp. EN/VU I/II Decreasing Persistent 250,000 kg-1/musk Increasing
Saiga antelope§ Saiga tartarica CR II Decreasing Persistent 877 kg-1/horn Increasing
Snow Leopard¶ Panthera uncia EN I Decreasing Persistent 73–1,670 kg-1/ –
bone, ≤10,000/skin
White rhinoceros∗∗ Ceratotherium simum NT I/II Increasing Increasing 65,000 kg-1/horn Increasing
Asiatic Black bear†† Ursus thibetanus VU I Decreasing Persistent 110-109,700 kg-1/ –
gallbladder, 710/paw
African elephant‡‡ Loxodonta africana VU I/II Increasing Increasing 6,500 kg-1/ivory Increasing
Sumatran Rhino∗∗ Dicerorhinus sumatrensis CR I Decreasing Persistent 65,000 kg-1/horn Increasing
∗Increasing poaching pressure based on NTCA (2012) and Stoner & Pervushina (2013), estimated retail value based on Moyle (2009); reliable data on
retail prices over time unavailable.
†Poaching pressure, prices, and price trends based on Challender (2011; unpublished data).
‡Estimated retail value, price trend, and poaching pressure based on Homes (1999) and Meng et al. (2012).
§Poaching pressure, estimated retail value, and price trend based on von Meibom et al. (2010).
¶Poaching pressure and estimated retail value based on Theile (2003) and EIA (2012); reliable data on price over time unavailable.
∗∗Poaching pressure, estimated retail value, and price trend based on Biggs et al. (2013) and Orenstein (2013). Price of Asian rhino horn estimated at the
equivalent of African horn.
††Prices based on Foley et al. (2011) and Challender (unpublished data) and poaching pressure on Garshelis & Steinmitz (2008); accurate data on retail
price over time unavailable.
‡‡Poaching pressure based on increasing levels of trade (e.g., Underwood et al. 2013) and declining populations (e.g., TAWIRI 2010). Stated price is for
2008 though current prices are understood to be higher based on Wittemyer et al. (2011) and Orenstein (2013).
Abensperg-Traun et al. 2011; Cooney & Abensperg-Traun
2013). As a result, there is a marked dichotomy between
globally defined conservation strategy and socioeco-
nomic reality in developing countries (Broad et al. 2003;
Abdullah et al. 2011; Velasquez Gomar & Stringer 2011).
Similarly, at the other end of the trade chain, regula-
tion does little to address consumer demand, especially in
status-conscious markets in East Asia where demand for
species such as those in Table 1 is strongest. This is despite
studies suggesting that changes in demand for wildlife
products have been more effective in controlling trade,
leading to population recovery, than a purely regulatory
approach (see IUCN 2001; Stiles 2004; Phillip et al. 2009).
Rising prices and increased levels of off-take for high-
value species indicate that demand may also be growing
and an understanding of consumer demand is therefore
crucial in terms of predicting the efficacy of enforcement
action (Table 1; Wittemyer et al. 2011; Underwood et al.
2013). For example, if demand for high-value species or
their derivative products is price-inelastic, that is quantity
of a given product consumed changes little with a pro-
portionate increase in price, which although is difficult
to quantify has been suggested for Rhino horn (see Biggs











Figure 1 Enforcement shifts supply to the left (from S1 to S2) but there is
little change in quantity consumed (Q1 to Q2) but a large increase in price
(P1 to P2). An increase in demand due to rising incomes shifts the demand
curve to the right (D1 to D2) that leads to further prices increases (P2 to P3)
and an increase in the quantity illegally traded and consumed (Q2 to Q3).
Price-inelastic demand is represented by the near vertical demand curves.
have only a minor impact on the quantity of the good de-
manded (see IUCN 2001; MacMillan & Han 2011; Conrad
2012). Figure 1 illustrates the consequences of enforcing
a trade ban on prices where demand is growing and is
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inelastic, represented by the near vertical demand curve.
While enforcing a trade ban causes a reduction in supply,
represented by a shift in the supply curve from S1 to S2,
there is little change in quantity consumed, from Q1 to
Q2, but a large increase in price from P1 to P2. Growing
price-inelastic demand, represented by a shift in the de-
mand curve from D1 to D2, leads to even higher prices,
P3, and an increase in quantity illegally traded and con-
sumed, Q3—a combination that inevitably points toward
an extinction pathway.
Although obtaining market information is difficult due
to the clandestine nature of illegal trade, where available
it suggests prices for high-value species and their deriva-
tives are rising, which, in turn, is leading to higher poach-
ing incentives (Table 1; Wittemyer et al. 2011; MacMil-
lan & Nguyen 2013). This is largely as a result of growing
and potentially price-inelastic demand from the burgeon-
ing metropolises of East Asia, where urban elites seek to
consume wildlife as “luxury” wild meats, as ingredients
in traditional medicines, and as curios (Anon 2010; Nij-
man 2010; Drury 2011). For example, the retail price of
rhino horn in Vietnam, which evidence suggests largely
comprises African rhino horn (e.g., Milliken & Shaw
2012) has reportedly increased to US$65,000 kg−1 in
recent years, substantially higher than comparable prices
in preceding decades in Asia, the retail price of pangolin
scales (kg−1), used in traditional medicines, increased
more than 30-fold in China between 1992 and 2012
(Challender, unpublished data), while similarly, prices
for ivory have reportedly doubled in recent years both
in end markets and source areas (Wittemyer et al. 2011;
Orenstein 2013) and evidence suggests that prices for
other high-value derivatives are also increasing (Table 1).
The growing relative poverty gap between source areas
for high-value wildlife and end markets is also crucially
important in understanding current levels of illegal trade.
High economic growth rates in China, Vietnam, and
Taiwan, averaging in excess of 7% in the last 2 decades
(IMF 2012), contrasts sharply with the economies of
major source countries for ivory for example, in East
Africa. For instance, Chinese GDP per capita in 2012 was
US$6,188.19, approximately 10 times that of Tanzania
(US$608.85) and 5 times that of Kenya (US$864.74)
based on World Bank (2013) figures. Similarly, Figure 2
shows the increasing disparity between key end-markets
for ivory, China, and Thailand, where increasing num-
bers of people now have the financial means to acquire
ivory, and major source countries, Kenya, Tanzania, and
Zimbabwe (Underwood et al. 2013). Growing relative
poverty within Asia is also an important factor in under-
standing current dynamics of illegal trade and is working
against antipoaching measures. Economic growth rates
in more remote, rural areas, where much remaining
biodiversity survives, are generally much lower and this
generates pressure on wildlife resources as villagers try to
“keep up” and increasingly seek the trappings of wealth
in a global economy (e.g., mobile phones, televisions,
cars, motorbikes, and designer clothes; see Anon 2004,
MacMillan & Nguyen 2013).
Using Vietnam as an example, Figure 3 shows eco-
nomic growth per capita for selected urban and rural
provinces here between 1996 and 2010. Growth has been
much stronger in the main urban centers of Ho Chi Minh
(HCM) city and Hanoi than in the rural provinces where
highly valued species such as pangolins may be found
(Anon 2004). In Hanoi and HCM city, the economy is
being driven by high-growth modern industries in the fi-
nance and high tech sectors, whereas rural areas remain
heavily dependent on primary production. Although food
prices have risen significantly in the last year, this decade
has seen food prices at their lowest level in 4 decades
in real terms (The Economist 2007) and to small-scale
farmers who are struggling to keep up, the capture and
sale of wildlife represents a relatively easy way of earn-
ing disposable income to buy sought after commodities
(MacMillan & Nguyen 2013).
Implementing sustained and determined enforcement
action to protect highly valued CITES-listed species,
especially enforcing trade bans, is not inherently effective
either. This is because it is increasingly driving trade “un-
derground” and into the hands of highly organized crim-
inal syndicates attracted by the high profits available, and
who have the know-how to avoid legal penalties given
their experience in other illicit trades such as smuggling
people and drugs (‘t Sas-Rolfes 2000; Leader-Williams
2003; Zimmerman 2008; South & Wyatt 2011; Conrad
2012). Although reliable data on the profitability of illicit
trades are difficult to obtain, increases in the price of
rhino horn were apparent following the 1977 rhino trade
ban, as was speculative stockpiling due to the apparent
high profits that could be made (‘t Sas-Rolfes 2000),
and more recently following the government crackdown
on whaling in South Korea in 2004 (MacMillan &
Han 2011). The engagement of organized criminality
is important because criminal gangs can quickly funnel
wildlife into booming demand centers based on their
know-how, their resources to bribe officials at all levels,
and their willingness to use violence and other forms
of intimidation where necessary to coerce local people
into poaching and smuggling wildlife. What is more, in
instances where arrests are made, fines can be relatively
trivial in relation to the size and profitability of the busi-
ness and therefore do not act as a deterrent (Wellsmith
2011; St. John et al. 2012). Yet, even where substantial
fines are issued, they may easily be paid. For example,
in a recent pangolin smuggling incident, the perpetrator
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Figure 2 Changes in GDP per capita (current U.S. dollars) between selected key markets for elephant ivory (China and Thailand) and primary source
countries (Kenya, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe) between 1992 and 2012 (Source: World Bank 2013).
was fined US$75,000 for trading pangolins (with a retail
value in China of over US$170,000) and the fine was
paid in full, in cash within hours of arrest (Hance 2012).
Toward a multifaceted international
response
In our view, there is a compelling case to consider a
change in approach to combat poaching of high-value
wildlife that should reflect the real drivers of illegal trade
by acknowledging market conditions, consumer prefer-
ences for wildlife products, species’ biology and ecology,
and the socioeconomic needs of communities at the lo-
cal and national level. In this section, we outline possible
short-, medium- and longer-term strategies that would
favor proconservation outcomes over poaching.
In the short-term local communities living in the
vicinity of high-value species offer the best chance of
conserving them (e.g., Roe 2011; MacMillan & Nguyen
2013). Despite the threat of legal sanctions, the poaching
and sale of wildlife remains an attractive option to local
people who seek greater disposable income, may have
a long cultural association with hunting but who may
also be intimidated into poaching by organized criminal
gangs (TRAFFIC 2008; MacMillan & Nguyen 2013). In
order to encourage local communities to conserve rather
than kill valued species, we need to provide incentives
that help them meet their livelihood expectations (Aziz
et al. 2013; Harihar et al. 2014). These incentives could
take many forms, including but not limited to, greater
disposable income, retraining, local empowerment,
secure tenure over land and resources, better access
to health and educational services and payments for
conservation services. These demands could be met by
the state as well as nonstate actors based on performance
in managing or protecting species, even protecting
wildlife in a fort-holding approach where appropriate,
and which could be validated by periodic population
surveys (MacMillan & Leader-Williams 2008; Zabel &
Holm-Muller 2008; Dinerstein et al. 2012; Duckworth
et al. 2012; Harihar et al. 2014). Critically, in developing
these community conservation packages, we must look
beyond compensation payments based on opportunity
costs, which may not always incentivize conservation
(Harihar et al. 2014), and look to create prosperity locally
from managing the conservation of high-value wildlife,
such is the case in the Ngorongoro crater, Tanzania.
Compensation in return for losses associated with living
with endangered species has become an established
practice (e.g., livestock predation), yet even when pay-
ments are paid in full and in a timely manner, it begs the
question why do we restrict payments to relatively small
sums as compensation for losses, or opportunity costs,
such as labor? Instead, why not pay local communities
much more in order to reflect the value of the service
they would provide by protecting species that are highly
valued globally? Willing-to-pay studies have shown
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Figure 3 Annual average income per capita (VNDmillions) for selected urban (Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi) and rural provinces (Ha Tinh, Quang Nam, Dak
Lak and Kon Tum) in Vietnam between 1996 and 2010 (Source: Vietnam Households Living Survey Standards 1996-2010).
that the conservation or “existence” value of wildlife is
considerably higher than its value as a commodity, the
opportunity costs of coexistence, or as an extinct species
(MacMillan et al. 1996; MacMillan et al. 2004; Ninan
2007). We therefore assert that mechanisms to more
generously reward local communities for partnership
in conservation should be established. Such approaches
would likely be affordable, efficient, and once introduced
would undermine the economic incentive for poaching
locally, while enforcing resource and land rights would
offer security against poachers coming in from outside.
Incentives need not be restricted to economic benefits
either as they do not have inherent universal appeal
especially where the targets of the policy are those with
relative wealth or already endowed with hunting rights
(e.g., MacMillan & Philip 2010). However, understand-
ing and working with local cultures and beliefs can
create significant opportunities for conservation. For
example, a successful approach may necessitate local
traditional hunting activities to ensure local elites, who
have traditionally had major roles in hunting, “buy in”
to conservation (MacMillan & Nguyen 2013). Or, as in
the case of the Tibetan antelope (Pantholops hodgsonii),
a marked reduction in poaching following stronger
policing of the Shahtoosh trade by Chinese authorities
in the 1990s was underpinned by strong support from
Tibetan communities involved in antipoaching patrols.
The mainstream adoption of this strategy would repre-
sent a radical shift from an enforcement geared approach,
at ever increasing cost, to more community-based nat-
ural resource management (CBNRM), an approach that
has previously proven key to conservation successes in
the past. A resounding example is the recovery of the
Vicun˜a (Vicugna vicugna) in South America (McAllister
et al. 2009). In Peru, for example, local campesino
communities, in return for jobs, the construction of a
school, and income from the sale of Vicun˜a products,
bought in to conservation of the species over which
they were eventually given tenure and property rights,
which ultimately contributed to a reduction in poaching
(Wheeler & Domingo 1997). Although the Parties to
CITES have recently reiterated the importance of local
community livelihoods in regulating trade, with the
adoption of Resolution 16.6 (CITES and livelihoods), it
is essential that this policy is converted into action with
livelihoods given greater attention in listing decisions,
implementation and funding. While we recognize that
a community-based approach is not a panacea against
sophisticated criminal gangs, this new strategy will
remove the disincentives to conserve wildlife under
current regulatory systems and may offer the best chance
of conserving high-value species in the short term
(Hutton & Leader-Williams 2003; Dickman et al. 2011;
Clements et al. 2013; MacMillan & Nguyen 2013).
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Figure 4 An increase insupply fromS1 toS2 theoretically reducesquantity
poached in the wild from Q1 to QP (QP to QF comprises production from
farming) and reduces price from P1 to P2.
The introduction of regulated trade and ranching and
farming of high-value endangered species should also
be reexamined in the medium term, informed through
further research into consumer preferences as well as
biological feasibility. This approach has previously proven
successful for crocodilians and led to reduced poaching
pressure on wild populations, even in countries with
weak governance (Hutton & Webb 2003; Jenkins et al.
2004). Recent research has also suggested the potential
for a regulated trade in rhino horn (see Biggs et al. 2013),
though some issues for investigation were identified here,
for instance, understanding the implications for the wild
population in terms of both supply aspects (e.g., trans-
action costs burden the legal supply chain) and demand
(e.g., the relative prices of illegal and legally sourced
products and the overall impact on demand). Nonethe-
less, should such issues be addressed, farming high-value
wildlife to increase supply should theoretically reduce the
price of wild species and hence reduce incentives to poach
(Bulte & Damania 2005). Figure 4 illustrates how an
increase in supply from S1 to S2 due to farmed production
causes a reduction in price from P1 to P2 and crucially,
reduces the off-take by poaching from the wild popula-
tion. With reduced poaching and farming, the majority of
consumption could comprise farmed products, QP to QF
in Figure 4, with supply from the wild reduced, from Q1
to QP. Although opponents of wildlife farming have sug-
gested that this is not a solution (e.g., Mockrin et al. 2005;
Gratwicke et al. 2008; Kirkpatrick & Emerton 2010), the
option needs to be considered carefully based on more,
impartial and in-depth research into supply and demand
for farmed wildlife products given the potential conser-
vation gains, not least the sustainable flow of money
legal trade could create, and should not be overlooked
because conservation groups are ethically opposed to









Figure 5 A reduction in demand fromD1 to D2 theoretically reduces both
price, from P1 to P2, and quantity consumed, from Q1 to Q2, of a given
wildlife product.
Historically, significant changes in demand, rather than
increased enforcement, have played a crucial role in re-
ducing trade volumes and species recovery (Roe et al.
2002; Philip et al. 2009). The conservation of high-value
trade-threatened species therefore necessitates coordi-
nated efforts to manage demand, for example, reduc-
ing consumer demand through investments in ambitious
social marketing campaigns targeted to consumers of
wildlife and their social networks. This approach should
ultimately lower incentives to poach by causing a reduc-
tion in quantity demanded and therefore price. This is
represented in Figure 5 by a shift in the demand curve
from D1 to D2 and the lowering of price from P1 to P2, and
quantity demanded from Q1 to Q2. However, despite the
urgent predicament facing many high-value species and
the apparent need to reduce demand, as well as recent
efforts to understand it in East Asia (e.g., Drury 2011;
Dutton et al. 2011), there is little evidence of strategies
to reduce demand having been effective here, i.e., led
to measurable changes in consumer behavior. As such,
more in-depth research into East Asian consumers is
essential with which to inform effective interventions
(Verı´ssimo et al. 2012). This necessitates a focus on con-
sumer preferences and purchasing behavior, in partic-
ular key attributes of wildlife products and species, as
well as the social dynamics of purchasing and consump-
tion, so that the right audience can be targeted with
the right message, through the right communications
medium. Devising interventions to alter behavior is cru-
cially important and can only be achieved through mul-
tidisciplinary research approaches combining consumer
psychology, social marketing, economics and education
to ensure that interventions go beyond merely raising
awareness about wildlife consumption.
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Conclusion
Regulation remains the principal tenet of conserving
species threatened by poaching for international trade
and the use of trade restrictions and bans continues to be
widely and universally promoted. Although we believe
that enforcement of regulation remains a necessary in-
strument for governing trade, our view is that reliance
on this approach alone is doomed to fail because it can-
not cope with the complexity of trade, the powerful mar-
ket dynamics of illegal products or the role poverty plays
in driving trade, especially where high-value species are
concerned. Conservationists, therefore, need to design
new strategies that actually reflect the powerful forces
that shape the modern world, forces that regulations such
as CITES cannot withstand. As more realistic approaches
are beginning to emerge to tackle other international
crimes such as drug trafficking, it is imperative that con-
servationists stop promoting regulation as the only solu-
tion because it reflects their own personal beliefs about
animal welfare and exploitation and instead focus more
on policies and strategies that reduce the price of ille-
gal wildlife products and increase the opportunity costs
of poaching by contributing to the eradication of rural
poverty. We appreciate that implementing some of these
measures will not be easy and will require considerable
political courage with no guarantee of success, but en-
gaging with and negotiating with local communities that
are best placed to conserve wildlife, and using economic
levers to both manage trade and support local communi-
ties are the essential first steps to preventing the immedi-
ate risk of extinction of the world’s most valued species.
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